The shattered Middle Eastern dream

The shattered Middle Eastern dream

Dr. David Govrin

The events that have transpired in the Arab Middle East since the beginning of last year at first gave the impression that the region was headed toward democratization, and that the establishment of representative-based and democratic governments was only a matter of time. This would happen – it appeared – as soon constitutions were drafted and free elections were held. But rather, this false impression was a product of what onlookers wished to see: that the changing face of the Middle East would be similar to the change that occurred in eastern Europe in the 1990s.

This wish was shattered when regional Arab political cultures found it difficult to adopt a whole new set of values: pluralism, freedom of expression, human rights, women’s rights and tolerance of minorities. Familial, tribal and ethnic loyalties overpowered the efforts to develop a sense of common citizenship in a modern nation. A good example of this can be seen in the bitter and bloody ethnic-religious battles between Sunni and Shiite Muslims in Iraq and Bahrain, or alternately, the clashes between Muslims and Copts in Egypt. These clashes brought to the surface the existing underlying tension between the different ethnicities and sects, exacerbated by the absence of minority rights. The extent to which a country protects its minorities can be used to gauge its ability to implement democracy.

We mustn’t ignore, however, the major shift that rocked the nations of the Middle East and brought down the years-long barriers of fear erected by authoritarian dictators through the use of power and oppression. This shift drastically modified that balance of power between dictators and their subjects, and the Arab street emerged, for the first time, as the decision maker in the region. Furthermore, the scent of change spread beyond the narrow political realm and inspired demands for change in social and cultural areas as well. It inspired women in Saudi Arabia to demand to be allowed to drive cars, for example. But these demands lack a coherent ideology, and are therefore powerless to shape a new agenda.

The Islamists’ landslide victories in the Tunisian and Egyptian elections prompted many onlookers to wonder what went wrong in the transfer of power from authoritarian rulers to the hands of young, liberal revolutionaries. In fact, nothing went wrong. The power of the well-organized Islamic parties to attract voters was, and remains, great. One of the main reasons for this political power is the fact that the Islamist parties have, for years, offered welfare services and aid to all. Their power also rests on the promise – yet untested – to use the magic of religion to cure all of society’s ills. The assertion that the integration of religious bodies into politics would necessarily curb their extremism has yet to be proven, especially in light of evidence to the contrary in Iran and Saudi Arabia and the rise of Hamas in Gaza. The key issue in this case will be how freedom of speech, rule of law, and human rights are handled and how women and minorities are treated under the new regimes.

It seems that the extent of the Islamist victory in the parliamentary elections in Egypt surprised even the Islamists themselves. These parties were caught unprepared and ran into difficulty presenting a coherent platform on how to handle national and social problems. The fear of accepting responsibility, especially for potential failures, prompted them to adhere to a partnership with the army, essentially putting off running the country alone. Their arguments, characterized by an apologetic tone, attempted to explain why they had failed to present a presidential candidate from among their own ranks, among other things.

The Islamist victories highlighted the debate over the character of the modern Arab nation, especially the delicate issue of religion and state. Unlike the Islamists who wish to model their country on Muslim law, the reformists seek to empower the people through representation in parliament. This ideology revolves around the idea that all inhabitants are granted equal citizenship – regardless of their nationality, religion or gender.

The disputes that will undoubtedly arise when these Arab nations attempt to draft a new constitution will not only highlight the deep gaps between these two opposing outlooks, they will also pose the reformists with a great challenge: changing the existing political behavioral patterns in to put individual and civil rights at the forefront.

The army, which has been the pillar of the modern Arab nation since the 1940s, will now have to adjust to a new reality. The immediate implication is that the army will have to share the leadership with the various Islamist parties. At this stage it may appear that the army and the Islamists are harmoniously running the country together after having achieved the common goal of removing the tyrant from power. However, it is a definite possibility that differences on diplomatic orientation and national identity will soon drive a wedge between them and may even devolve into bitter battles (like the ones seen in Sudan under the rule of Hassan al-Turabi, who assisted in Omar al-Bashir’s rise to power in 1989, became his opponent and was thrown in prison for dissent.)

It is not unfathomable that the enormous social and economic challenges facing Arab nations today, especially Egypt, will eventually bring about a growing military presence in government, possibly to the point of retaking the reigns.

The writer is a department head in the Foreign Ministry.

http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_opinion.php?id=1552